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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently held in Medical Staff of 
Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center v. Avera Marshall that medical 
staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract between a hospital 
and its medical staff.1 Finding no preexisting duties, the majority 
 
        †   JD Candidate, Mitchell Hamline School of Law, 2017; BA English, Saint 
Olaf College, 2014. I would like to extend special thanks to Debra Hsu, for the 
countless hours she spent listening to my ideas and supporting me through this 
process. 
 1.  Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall (Avera 
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determined that medical staff bylaws hold sufficient consideration 
to create an enforceable contract.2 
This case note begins by exploring contract formation in 
general and the history of construing medical staff bylaws as 
contractual obligations.3 Then, it discusses the facts of Avera 
Marshall, the rationale of the majority, and the rationale of the 
dissent.4 Next, it argues that the Minnesota Supreme Court failed 
to accurately discern both a lack of consideration, as well as mutual 
assent that should have precluded the formation of a contract.5 
Finally, this note raises several public policy concerns that the 
majority opinion overlooked and concludes that Avera Marshall may 
stifle hospital boards’ future attempts to resolve staffing conflicts.6 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW 
A. Contract Formation in General 
The formation of a contract requires three elements: (1) a 
manifestation of mutual assent, (2) an exchange of bargained-for 
promises, and (3) consideration.7 Mutual assent is a “meeting of 
the minds concerning [a contract’s] essential elements.”8 
Expressions of mutual assent are assessed under an objective 
standard.9 It is well settled that mutual assent is lacking where one 
party expresses a clear intent to not be bound by the agreement.10 
 
Marshall IV), 857 N.W.2d 695, 703–04 (Minn. 2014). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  See infra Part II. 
 4.  See infra Part III. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.A–.B. 
 6.  See infra Parts IV.C–.D, V. 
 7.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 8.  SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 
N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Minneapolis 
Cablesystems v. City of Minneapolis, 299 N.W.2d 121, 122 (Minn. 1980)). 
 9.  Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 532, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 
(1962) (“Expressions of mutual assent, by words or conduct, must be judged 
objectively, not subjectively.”). 
 10.  See Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951) 
(“No contract is formed by the signing of an instrument when the offeree is aware 
that the offerer does not intend to be bound by the wording in the instrument.” 
(citing Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N.W. 835 (1915))); Wells Constr. Co. v. 
Goder Incinerator Co., 173 Minn. 200, 205, 217 N.W. 112, 114 (1927) (holding 
that no contract was created when one party did not intend to be bound). 
2
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“Consideration requires that one party to a transaction voluntarily 
assumes an obligation on the condition of an act or forbearance by 
the other party.”11 However, it is plainly established that a promise 
to do something that one is already legally obligated to do does not 
constitute consideration.12 
B. Medical Staff Bylaws in General 
Under Minnesota Administrative Rule 4640.0800, any hospital 
used by two or more health practitioners is required to organize its 
practitioners into a medical staff.13 The medical staff oversees the 
clinical and scientific work of the hospital.14 Minnesota law also 
requires the medical staff to “adopt bylaws, rules, regulations, and 
policies for the proper conduct of its work.”15 From this statutory 
obligation springs a set of rules and regulations commonly referred 
to as medical staff bylaws.16 In their most basic form, medical staff 
bylaws outline the organizational and governing structure of the 
medical staff within the hospital’s broader institutional 
framework.17 Generally, the bylaws determine the procedural 
relationship between physicians and the hospital regarding 
 
 11.  U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 578 N.W.2d 752, 754 
(Minn. 1998); see also Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 258 Minn. 533, 539, 104 
N.W.2d 661, 665 (1960) (“Consideration . . . insures that the promise enforced as 
a contract is not accidental, casual, or gratuitous, but has been uttered 
intentionally as the result of some deliberation, manifested by reciprocal 
bargaining or negotiation.”). 
 12.  See Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 1985) 
(stating the common law rule that a promise to do what one is already legally 
obligated to do is insufficient consideration); Hilde v. Int’l Harvester Co., 166 
Minn. 259, 260, 207 N.W. 617, 618 (1926) (recognizing that a promise to perform 
a prior legal obligation was “a mere naked promise” and did not constitute 
consideration). 
 13.  MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2 (2013). Generally, a hospital’s medical 
staff consists of “fully licensed physicians and may include other licensed 
individuals permitted by law and by the hospital to provide patient care services 
independently in the hospitals.” Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of 
Hospitals’ Physician Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 604 
(2000) (footnote omitted). 
 14.  MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 1. 
 15.  Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2. 
 16.  See id. 
 17.  See JAMES T. O’REILLY, JOLENE SOBOTKA & PHILIP HAGAN, A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE TO HOSPITAL LIABILITY 18 (2011). 
3
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physician credentialing and the granting or revoking of clinical 
privileges.18 
In this context, clinical “privileges” are the right of individual 
physicians to admit their patients to specific hospitals and 
administer care within that hospital.19 The most common 
relationship between hospitals and physicians involves the 
physicians as independent contractors who are granted privileges 
to admit and care for patients at a specific hospital.20 In Minnesota, 
all patients admitted to a hospital must be placed under the care of 
a member of the hospital’s medical staff.21 Thus, any physician 
granted privileges at a Minnesota hospital is, by definition, a 
member of the medical staff and subject to all of the rights and 
obligations that status entails.22 
C. Medical Staff Bylaws as Enforceable Contracts 
A majority of courts have determined “that a hospital’s medical 
staff bylaws . . . [constitute] a binding contract between the hospital 
and its medical staff . . . .”23 These courts have generally been 
influenced by a concern that such bylaws would be meaningless if 
hospitals were not legally bound by them.24 Countering this 
concern is an equally significant public interest in allowing 
hospitals free discretion to address medical staff issues that may 
affect the standard of patient care.25 Thus, a number of courts have 
 
 18.  Id. (“Bylaws include, e.g., what doctors can be credentialed, and what 
qualifications for requisite licensure, training, skill, and experience will have to be 
met and documented. Through medical staff policies, the medical staff sets 
criteria for conducting personnel evaluation, which is also known as the 
credentialing process.”). 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  Id. at 18–19. 
 21.  MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 3. 
 22.  O’REILLY, SOBOTKA & HAGAN, supra note 17, at 18–19. 
 23.  Dallon, supra note 13, at 640 n.288 (listing cases that held medical staff 
bylaws were enforceable contracts). 
 24.  See, e.g., Bouquett v. St. Elizabeth Corp., 538 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ohio 1989) 
(“The cases holding that a hospital is bound by its staff bylaws base their decisions 
on the reasoning that if the hospital is not bound by the bylaws, then essentially 
the bylaws would be meaningless.”). 
 25.  See Zipper v. Health Midwest, 978 S.W.2d 398, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(expressing concern that enforcing medical bylaws as a contract could cause a 
hospital’s concern of potential liability to “unduly impugn a hospital’s actions in 
terminating the privileges of a physician providing substandard patient care”).  
4
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also held that medical staff bylaws do not constitute an enforceable 
contract.26 
The most common ground for rejecting medical staff bylaws is 
a lack of consideration.27 Often this perceived lack of consideration 
results from a preexisting duty under state law to adopt medical 
staff bylaws.28 However, some courts consider all of the 
circumstances surrounding the hospital-physician relationship 
when determining the existence of a contract.29 Such courts 
acknowledge a hospital’s preexisting legal obligation to establish 
medical staff bylaws but consider the question of consideration 
under the hospital’s discretionary decision to grant privileges to 
individual physicians.30 Essentially, the consideration in question is 
not the bylaws themselves, but rather the individualized granting of 
privileges to a specified physician.31 While the hospital does have a 
statutory obligation to create and maintain medical staff bylaws, it 
does not have an obligation to grant clinical privileges to any 
 
 26. See Dallon, supra note 13, at 641 n.290 (listing cases that have declared 
that medical staff bylaws are not an enforceable contract). 
 27.  See, e.g., Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1001–02 
(N.D. Ga. 1992) (concluding that bylaws could not constitute a contract due to a 
lack of consideration); Zipper, 978 S.W.2d at 416 (holding that bylaws lacked the 
consideration required to form a contract). 
 28.  See, e.g., Kessel v. Monongalia Cty. Gen. Hosp. Co., 600 S.E.2d 321, 326 
(W. Va. 2004) (finding consideration lacking where a hospital had a preexisting 
duty under state law to adopt medical staff bylaws); see also O’Byrne v. Santa 
Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“[State 
regulations] required the Medical Center to appoint a medical staff, they required 
the medical staff to adopt bylaws, and they required the medical staff to abide by 
those bylaws. Clearly . . . neither the Medical Center nor plaintiff conferred on the 
other any more than what was required by law.”). 
 29.  See Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 557 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Conn. 1989) 
(holding that extending privileges to a physician was something beyond what a 
hospital was already bound to do and that the physician’s return promise to abide 
by medical staff bylaws constituted adequate consideration); Virmani v. 
Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 488 S.E.2d 284, 288 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) 
(finding a contract by comparing a doctor’s relationship with a hospital before 
and after joining its staff).  
 30.  See, e.g., Virmani, 488 S.E.2d at 288 (acknowledging statutory 
requirements for staff bylaws as a preexisting duty but holding that when “a 
hospital offers to extend a particular physician the privilege to practice medicine 
in that hospital it goes beyond its statutory obligation”). 
 31.  Id. 
5
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individual physician.32 Thus, it follows that there is no preexisting 
duty that would otherwise preclude the element of consideration.33 
Some jurisdictions that reject such arguments, finding no 
contractual consideration in medical staff bylaws, concede that the 
bylaws may yet form contractual rights where the bylaws contain 
language expressing the rights of medical staff under the bylaws.34 
Other jurisdictions reject medical staff bylaws as enforceable 
contracts but acknowledge that those same bylaws may be judicially 
enforceable despite their lack of contractual status.35 Indeed, in 
Robles v. Humana Hospital Cartersville, the Northern District of 
Georgia expressly denied that medical staff bylaws create 
contractual rights but subsequently concluded that the bylaws at 
issue were nonetheless judicially enforceable.36 The court reasoned 
that the “legislature would not have mandated that the hospital 
create these procedures, if the legislature had not intended that 
 
 32.  See, e.g., Gianetti, 557 A.2d at 1254 (“It can hardly be said that the hospital 
must extend privileges to every physician who seeks them.”); Virmani, 488 S.E.2d at 
288 (“When, however, a hospital offers to extend a particular physician the 
privilege to practice medicine in that hospital it goes beyond its statutory 
obligation.”). 
 33.  Gianetti, 557 A.2d at 1255 (finding valid consideration where “[t]he 
hospital changed its position by granting medical staff privileges and the plaintiff 
physician [had] likewise changed his position in doing something he was not 
previously bound to do, i.e., to ‘abide’ by the hospital medical staff bylaws”); 
Virmani, 488 S.E.2d at 288 (“If the offer is accepted by the physician, the physician 
receives the benefit of being able to treat his patients in the hospital and the 
hospital receives the benefit of providing care to the physician’s patients. . . . 
[T]hese benefits constitute sufficient and legal consideration . . . .”). 
 34.  See Mason v. Cent. Suffolk Hosp., 819 N.E.2d 1029, 1032 (N.Y. 2004) 
(stating that the court would enforce medical staff bylaws as a contract if clearly 
written, but concluding that the bylaws in the case before it formed no such 
contract); Holt v. Good Samaritan Hosp. & Health Ctr., 590 N.E.2d 1318, 1322 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“[Medical] staff bylaws constitute a binding contract ‘only 
where there can be found in the bylaws an intent by both parties to be bound.’” 
(quoting Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985))). 
 35.  See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D. 
Ga. 1992) (“[T]his Court concludes that . . . the hospital bylaws, by themselves, do 
not constitute a contract per se between the hospital and the doctors. . . . 
[H]owever, . . . the hospital is bound by the bylaws it does create and . . . the Court 
can enjoin the hospital to follow those procedures.”); Egan v. St. Anthony’s Med. 
Ctr., 244 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Mo. 2008) (holding that no contractual obligation 
arises from medical staff bylaws but a hospital is nevertheless bound to act in 
accordance with its bylaws insofar as the bylaws are required under a regulatory 
scheme). 
 36.  785 F. Supp. at 1002. 
6
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the hospital follow the procedures once they were implemented.”37 
According to the court, although a preexisting statutory duty 
precluded contract formation, that same statutory duty obligated 
the hospital to abide by its own bylaws and thereby empowered the 
court to enjoin the hospital to act on its obligation.38 Importantly, 
this limited judicial review only pertained to a reinstatement of 
privileges or an injunction.39 Therefore, a plaintiff could not 
recover damages under the medical staff bylaws.40 
In Egan v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri followed a similar reasoning to Robles, holding that the 
public policy behind the governing regulation empowered the 
court to provide injunctive relief to a plaintiff-physician seeking 
enforcement of a hospital’s medical staff bylaws.41 The court 
specifically noted that “[a] hospital’s obligation to act in 
accordance with its bylaws . . . is independent of any contractual 
obligation the hospital may have to the doctor.”42 Additionally, the 
court emphasized that “the purpose of the regulation is to 
implement a system of medical staff peer review, rather than 
judicial oversight . . . .”43 Despite the court’s limited judicial review 
of the hospital’s actions, the final authority regarding medical 
staffing decisions remains indisputably in the hands of the 
hospital’s governing body.44 According to the court, this distinction 
arises from the underlying notion behind the regulatory scheme, 
which assumes that medical professionals are best qualified to 
police themselves.45 Thus, any judicial oversight exercised under 
the court’s ruling may seek only to ensure substantial compliance 
with the hospital’s bylaws rather than questioning the merits of a 
hospital’s staffing decisions.46 
 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. (denying the plaintiff’s claim because he only sought damages rather 
than reinstatement or injunction). 
 41.  Egan, 244 S.W.3d at 173–74 (stating that the public policy behind the 
regulation protects both patients and “physicians improperly subjected to 
disciplinary action” (citation omitted)). 
 42.  Id. at 174. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. (citing the language of the governing state statute in support of its 
conclusion). 
 46.  Id. 
7
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D. Medical Staff Bylaws and Contractual Rights in Minnesota 
Although Minnesota law has never explicitly recognized 
medical staff bylaws as an enforceable contract, in 1977 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Campbell v. St. Mary’s Hospital implied 
that an enforceable contract may arise from medical staff bylaws.47 
In Campbell, the court considered the narrow question of whether a 
surgeon had been afforded proper due process in the revocation of 
his medical privileges at St. Mary’s Hospital.48 Engaging in a twofold 
analysis, the court first assessed possible due process claims under 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and, in 
dismissing the constitutional questions, subsequently examined the 
plaintiff’s due process rights as established under the medical staff 
bylaws of St. Mary’s Hospital.49 
First, the court questioned the applicability of constitutional 
due process to the plaintiff’s claims.50 Due to St. Mary’s Hospital’s 
status as a private hospital, rather than a public one, the potential 
application of constitutional protections was not readily apparent.51 
The court briefly discussed an “entanglement” theory implemented 
by some jurisdictions wherein private hospitals receiving sufficient 
federal funds may be subject to Fourteenth Amendment 
requirements.52 However, due to the lack of meaningful facts in the 
record for determining the degree of entanglement, the court 
refused to consider the constitutional question and did not directly 
adopt or reject the entanglement theory.53 
 
 47.  312 Minn. 379, 388, 252 N.W.2d 581, 587 (1977) (affirming summary 
judgment against a doctor’s breach of contract claim because “under the bylaws 
plaintiff was afforded a full measure of his contractual due process rights at every 
stage of the proceedings to revoke his surgical privileges . . . .”).  
 48.  Id. at 384, 252 N.W.2d at 584–85. 
 49.  Id. at 386–87, 252 N.W.2d at 586. 
 50.  Id. at 384, 252 N.W.2d at 585 (stating that constitutional due process 
would only apply “if the actions to terminate plaintiff’s surgical privileges were 
done under color of state law”). 
 51.  Id. at 385, 252 N.W.2d at 585 (“While there is no doubt that the 
operation of a public hospital would constitute state action, the issue becomes 
considerably more complex when considering the activities of hospitals which, like 
St. Mary’s, are wholly private.”). 
 52.  Id. (citing Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 
1963)). 
 53.  Id. at 386, 252 N.W.2d at 586 (“Since it would be mere conjecture for us 
to presuppose that such an entanglement existed, we review the revocation of 
plaintiff’s privileges apart from any constitutional considerations.”). 
8
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Following the court’s refusal to apply Fourteenth Amendment 
considerations to the plaintiff’s claim, the court examined the 
plaintiff’s due process rights under St. Mary’s Hospital medical staff 
bylaws.54 Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts 
of the case demonstrated that the plaintiff had received the full 
scope of his due process rights as outlined within the medical staff 
bylaws.55 Therefore, the court concluded that there was no violation 
of the plaintiff’s due process rights when St. Mary’s Hospital 
revoked his surgical privileges.56 
While the court in Campbell did not explicitly address the 
contractual enforceability of medical staff bylaws, the specific 
language of the opinion appears to imply the contractual nature of 
such bylaws.57 The court’s specific recognition of the plaintiff’s 
“contractual due process rights” under the medical staff bylaws 
suggests that such bylaws may forge certain contractual 
obligations.58 In the context of the plaintiff’s breach of contract 
claim,59 however, such language may simply indicate the particular 
legal contours of an isolated case. Indeed, although the court did 
not challenge the plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were 
contractual in nature, there was no need to make such a challenge 
as the facts of the case indicate that, regardless of the specific 
nature of the plaintiff’s rights, all due process procedures 
established by the medical staff bylaws were properly followed.60 
Thus, the court needed not, and did not, directly address the 
question of whether the bylaws constitute an enforceable contract. 
In fact, a careful reading of the court’s opinion reveals a narrow 
resolution of the dispute predicated on the hospital’s proper 
adherence to the due process procedure as required by the medical 
staff bylaws.61 
Given the court’s narrow resolution in Campbell, the 
jurisprudential value of its ruling as applied to contractual 
 
 54.  Id. at 387, 252 N.W.2d at 586. 
 55.  Id. at 388, 252 N.W.2d at 587. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 59.  Id. at 380, 252 N.W.2d at 583. 
 60.  Id. at 387, 252 N.W.2d at 586 (“We therefore hold that under the bylaws 
plaintiff was afforded a full measure of his contractual due process rights at every 
stage of the proceedings to revoke his surgical privileges . . . .”). 
 61.  Id. 
9
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enforceability of medical staff bylaws is arguably minimal. Although 
the language of the opinion hints at an implied contractual status, 
the contextual background of the decision limits the scope of such 
an implication. Despite its narrow applicability, Campbell was the 
last major Minnesota case regarding medical staff bylaws and 
contractual rights prior to Avera Marshall. 
III. THE AVERA MARSHALL DECISION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center is a non-profit 
hospital located in Marshall, Minnesota.62 In accordance with Avera 
Marshall’s corporate bylaws, Avera Marshall’s board of directors is 
required to organize “a medical-dental staff under medical-dental 
staff bylaws approved by the [board].”63 Under the bylaws, the 
medical staff is primarily “physicians with admitting and clinical 
privileges to care for patients at the hospital.”64 The medical staff is 
internally represented by the Medical Executive Committee 
(MEC), which acts on its behalf.65 
Prior to May 1, 2012, the medical staff bylaws stated that any 
practitioner wishing to admit patients to the hospital first needed 
to be a member of the medical staff.66 To become a member of the 
medical staff, “a physician was required to agree to be bound by the 
medical staff bylaws.”67 Under the bylaws, the medical staff was 
granted authority, “[s]ubject to the authority and approval of [the 
board],” to “exercise such power as is reasonably necessary to 
discharge its responsibilities under these bylaws and under the 
corporate bylaws of the Medical Center.”68 
Importantly, the medical staff bylaws also established the 
amendment and repeal process for the bylaws.69 Under the medical 
staff bylaws, amendments to or repeal of the bylaws could be 
proposed by “the Chief of Staff, the MEC, the [executive] board, or 
 
 62.  Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall, 857 
N.W.2d 695, 696 (Minn. 2014). 
 63.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 696–97. 
 68.  Id. at 697 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
 69.  Id. 
10
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one-third of active medical staff members.”70 Specifically, section 
17.2 of the former bylaws required that any proposed amendment 
or repeal had to receive an affirmative vote by two-thirds of the 
eligible medical staff members.71 Even with the approval of the 
medical staff, any change recommended by the medical staff 
required the executive board’s approval to become effective.72 
However, the bylaws remained silent with regard to whether 
changes proposed by the board required the approval of the 
medical staff.73 That being said, the bylaws plainly stated that the 
amendment and repeal process remained “‘subject to approval by a 
majority vote of [the board]’ and could not ‘supersede the general 
authority of [the board] as set forth in its corporate bylaws or 
applicable common law or statutes.’”74 
In 2012, Avera Marshall’s governing board announced its 
intent to repeal the current medical staff bylaws and proposed a 
revised set of bylaws.75 Although the board solicited input from the 
medical staff, it refused to submit the proposed changes to the 
medical staff for a vote in accordance with section 17.2 of the 
bylaws.76 Disregarding the board’s refusal to submit the proposed 
changes to a vote, the medical staff held a vote anyway, rejecting 
both the repeal of the former bylaws and the implementation of 
the revised bylaws.77 
Ultimately, the board’s unilateral revisions took effect on May 
1, 2012.78 As a result, two individual physicians and the medical staff 
as a whole filed a nine-count action against Avera Marshall seeking, 
among other things, a declaration that the former medical staff 
bylaws constituted an enforceable contract between Avera Marshall 
and the medical staff.79 The medical staff “sought to enjoin Avera 
 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. (“Section 17.2 of the bylaws specifically provided that, for the 
purposes of enacting a bylaws change, the change shall require an affirmative vote 
of . . . two-thirds of the Members eligible to vote.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id. (noting the medical staff’s invocation of section 17.2 of the former 
bylaws as the basis for justifying a medical staff vote in spite of the board’s actions). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Recognizing the medical staff bylaws as an enforceable contract would 
11
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Marshall from repealing the former bylaws and enforcing the 
revised bylaws.”80 
The district court granted Avera Marshall’s motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the medical staff bylaws did not 
constitute an enforceable contract.81 Additionally, the district court 
granted a second summary judgment motion, denying the medical 
staff’s standing to sue as a group.82 Furthermore, the district court 
concluded that Avera Marshall had the authority to unilaterally 
modify the bylaws without the medical staff’s approval so long as 
“[Avera Marshall] substantially complie[d] with the procedural 
prerequisites contained in the Medical Staff Bylaws.”83 
Affirming the district court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
concluded that the medical staff bylaws did not constitute an 
enforceable contract and that the medical staff lacked standing to 
sue.84 Because the medical staff bylaws were not contractual, the 
court of appeals also concluded that Avera Marshall had the 
authority to unilaterally amend the laws.85 On appeal to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, the two primary issues argued were 
whether the medical staff had standing to sue and whether the 
medical staff bylaws constituted an enforceable contract.86 
 
mean that Avera Marshall’s unilateral amendment, in violation of the terms of the 
medical staff bylaws, was a breach of the contract between the medical staff and 
Avera Marshall and therefore judicially redressable by the court. See id. at 700 
(“Appellants further argue that Avera Marshall was obligated to comply with the 
terms of the bylaws and that Avera Marshall breached the former bylaws’ 
amendment and repeal provision by unilaterally modifying the bylaws.”). In 
addition to a declaration of an enforceable contract, the medical staff also sought 
to establish that the medical staff, as a body, had standing and the capacity to sue 
Avera Marshall. Id. at 698. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Marshall (Avera Marshall 
I), No. 42-CV-12-69, 2012 WL 5962355 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 24, 2012). 
 82.  Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Marshall (Avera Marshall 
II), No. 42-CV-12-69, 2012 WL 6755586 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 6, 2012). 
 83.  Avera Marshall I, 2012 WL 5962355, at *2. 
 84.  Med. Staff of Avera Marshall Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Avera Marshall (Avera 
Marshall III), 836 N.W.2d 549, 562 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013). 
 85.  Id. at 560. 
 86.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 698–99 (Minn. 2014). This case note 
will focus on the issue of contract enforceability. The majority held that the 
medical staff had standing to sue because they satisfied the satutory criteria of 
section 540.151 of Minnesota Statutes. See id. at 699. 
12
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Regarding the enforceability issue, the primary question 
revolved around whether the medical staff bylaws constituted 
adequate consideration for the purposes of creating an enforceable 
contract.87 The physicians and medical staff argued that the 
requisite consideration was each physician’s agreement to be 
bound by the bylaws in return for appointment to Avera Marshall’s 
medical staff.88 Avera Marshall countered that adopting the bylaws 
did not constitute adequate consideration because the hospital had 
a preexisting legal duty to adopt such bylaws in accordance with 
Minnesota Administrative Rules.89 Ultimately, the supreme court 
reversed the court of appeals’ decision, holding that the former 
medical staff bylaws constituted an enforceable contract and, 
therefore, that Avera Marshall could not unilaterally amend the 
bylaws.90 
B. Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
The majority grounded its decision on two points of reasoning. 
First, the majority reasoned that although Minnesota 
Administrative Rules required the creation of medical staff bylaws, 
they did not require the bylaws to contain any specific provisions.91 
Thus, the rules set only the minimum requirements for adopting 
bylaws.92 Following this conclusion, the court stated that “[b]ylaws 
which exceed the minimum standards required under state law 
satisfy the consideration requirement.”93 Therefore, the court 
concluded that although the hospital had a preexisting obligation 
to adopt medical staff bylaws, that obligation was not dispositive 
with regard to whether the adopted bylaws provided the basis for 
an enforceable contract.94 
Second, because the hospital’s obligation to adopt medical 
staff bylaws was not dispositive, the court then considered whether 
 
 87.  Id. at 700. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id.; see also MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2 (2013) (requiring that a 
hospital’s medical staff shall “formulate and, with the approval of the governing 
body, adopt bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies for the proper conduct of its 
work”). 
 90.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 704. 
 91.  Id. at 702. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. (citing Dallon, supra note 13, at 647). 
 94.  Id. 
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the specific facts of the case demonstrated suitable consideration 
regarding the bylaws.95 The central point of the court’s rationale 
was the hospital’s requirement that each physician agree to be 
bound by the medical staff bylaws in return for clinical privileges at 
the hospital.96 Importantly, the majority made the clear distinction 
that the medical staff bylaws did not, in and of themselves, generate 
adequate consideration.97 Rather, consideration arose because 
“with the appointment of each member to the Medical Staff . . . 
each member of the Medical Staff agreed to be bound by the 
medical staff bylaws and Avera Marshall agreed to let each member 
of the Medical Staff practice at its hospital.”98 The consideration 
provided by each member of the medical staff was his or her 
agreement to be bound by the medical staff bylaws.99 Avera 
Marshall provided practicing privileges to each member in return 
for his or her agreement to be bound by the bylaws.100 Since Avera 
Marshall and the members of its medical staff both “voluntarily 
assumed obligations on the condition of an act or forbearance on 
the part of the other,” the requisite element of consideration was 
satisfied.101 
Responding to the dissent’s claim that a preexisting legal duty 
requires hospitals to impose and abide by medical staff bylaws,102 
the majority stated that, while Avera Marshall may have had a 
preexisting duty to formulate medical staff bylaws, such a duty did 
not translate to a preexisting legal duty to grant a particular 
physician practicing privileges at its hospital.103 Thus, the court 
 
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id. at 703. 
 97.  Id. at 703 n.6 (“[C]onsideration does not exist simply because the 
medical staff bylaws exist.”). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 703. 
 102.  Id. at 706 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Medical Staff was bound by 
law to formulate bylaws and Avera Marshall had a legal obligation to . . . also adopt 
bylaws . . . . Consequently, the Medical Staff’s and Avera Marshall’s fulfillment of 
their legal obligations . . . was simply the fulfillment of a preexisting legal duty        
. . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 103.  Id. at 703 n.6 (majority opinion) (“The dissent, however, fails to explain 
how, before the appointment of each member to its medical staff, Avera Marshall 
was under a preexisting legal duty to allow that particular physician to practice at 
its hospital . . . .”). 
14
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ruled that adequate consideration existed.104 In addition, the court 
determined that the transaction involved a bargained-for exchange 
of promises and mutual consent to the exchange because Avera 
Marshall offered clinical privileges to each member of the medical 
staff on the condition that they be bound by the medical staff 
bylaws, and each member of the medical staff accepted the offer of 
privileges and agreed to be bound by the bylaws.105 Therefore, 
finding all of the requisite elements of a contract,106 the court 
concluded that the medical staff bylaws constituted an enforceable 
contract.107 
C. Rationale of the Dissent 
The dissent rejected the reasoning of the majority, 
maintaining that the medical staff bylaws lacked consideration 
because adoption of the bylaws was simply the “fulfillment of a 
preexisting legal duty, and thus neither party conferred on the 
other any more than what the law already required.”108 Although 
the bylaws may exceed the minimum requirements of state law, the 
dissent concluded that the bylaws lacked consideration because the 
relevant Minnesota rule provides broad discretion for the medical 
staff and hospital to formulate and approve the bylaws.109 The logic 
follows that, given the broad discretion granted by the governing 
state law, it is not clear how the medical staff bylaws exceed the 
minimum requirements.110 
In addition, the dissent challenged the majority’s framing of 
the argument in terms of consideration given to each individual 
physician granted privileges by the hospital.111 Despite the 
 
 104.  Id. at 703. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Those elements are: (1) a manifestation of mutual assent, (2) a 
bargained-for exchange of promises, and (3) consideration. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 107.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 704. 
 108.  Id. at 706 (Anderson, J., dissenting). The dissent also extended its 
analysis by assessing that Avera Marshall had authority to unilaterally amend the 
bylaws despite the lack of an enforceable contract. See id. at 709–11 (holding that 
the broad discretion and final authority granted to the board of directors 
permitted the unilateral amendment of the medical staff bylaws). 
 109.  Id. at 706 n.7; MINN. R. 4640.0800 (2013). 
 110.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 706. 
 111.  Id. (pressing the acknowledgment by the majority that “members of the 
Medical Staff had no ability to change or otherwise alter the bylaws” and stating 
15
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majority’s insistence that consideration existed because “each 
member of the Medical Staff agreed to be bound . . . and Avera 
Marshall agreed to let each member of the Medical Staff practice at 
its hospital,”112 the dissent contended that both parties were already 
under “a preexisting legal duty to perform these functions, and 
thus, there was no consideration.”113 
Furthermore, the dissent found that, even if consideration 
existed, the contract was invalid because it lacked mutual assent.114 
There can be no mutual assent where one party clearly manifests 
intent to not be bound by the present agreement.115 Thus, where 
the language of the bylaws expressed a clear intent by Avera 
Marshall to retain final authority over the hospital and medical 
staff, it is plain that the board did not intend to be bound by the 
terms of those bylaws.116 
Additionally, the dissent argued that the medical staff bylaws 
failed to clearly identify the parties subject to the alleged 
contract.117 The issue of party identification arises from the 
ambiguity of the medical staff’s arguments, namely, who is the party 
allegedly contracting with Avera Marshall?118 Is it the medical staff 
as a whole, or is it each individual medical staff member and Avera 
Marshall?119 As the dissent stated, “The problem with the absence of 
clearly identified parties is that we simply do not know, and cannot 
know, whether an additional necessary component of contract 
formation is present here: an objective manifestation of mutual 
assent.”120 Given this ambiguity, the dissent contended that there 
could not have been objective assent to the contract’s essential 
terms.121 Even if the contracting parties were not ambiguous, the 
 
that “[t]here is no evidence to support the conclusion that the medical staff bylaws 
are supported by consideration regarding each individual medical staff member”). 
 112.  Id. at 703 n.6 (majority opinion). 
 113.  Id. at 706 n.7 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 114.  Id. at 707. 
 115.  Id. (citing Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174 
(1951); Wells Constr. Co. v. Goder Incinerator Co., 173 Minn. 200, 205, 217 N.W. 
112, 114 (1927)). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. at 708. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. (citing 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:2 (4th ed. 
2008)). 
 121.  Id. 
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dissent argued that the bylaws could not constitute an enforceable 
contract absent express language “stating that the provisions of the 
bylaws are enforceable against the hospital.”122 
Following this conclusion that the medical staff bylaws do not 
constitute a contract, the dissent addressed the final issue on 
appeal of whether Avera Marshall’s governing board had the 
authority to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws.123 
Dismissing the appellants’ arguments, the dissent concluded that 
Avera Marshall had the authority to unilaterally amend the medical 
staff bylaws.124 The dissent’s conclusion included two primary 
arguments: (1) the corporate structure of Avera Marshall implied 
that any authority granted to the medical staff was necessarily 
derived from the ultimate authority of the governing board and the 
corporate bylaws,125 and (2) Avera Marshall’s authority to 
unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws was expressly reserved 
in the medical staff bylaws themselves.126 Thus, Avera Marshall’s 
unilateral amendment of the medical staff bylaws violated neither a 
contractual obligation nor the designated bounds of its authority 
under its internal procedures. 
Finally, the dissent appealed to public interest in allowing a 
hospital’s board of directors to address problems within its medical 
staff “by amending the medical staff bylaws, without fear of 
prolonged litigation.”127 Although a hospital board may not 
necessarily make the correct decision, it must still be able to act 
within its authority “when it has expressly reserved ultimate 
 
 122.  Id. at 709. 
 123.  Id. (“The appellants, representing the interests of the medical staff, argue 
that Avera Marshall breached the medical staff bylaws by unilaterally changing the 
bylaws over the objection of the majority of medical staff members.”). 
 124.  Id. (“[U]nder the terms of Avera Marshall’s corporate bylaws and the 
medical staff bylaws, the board of directors was authorized to unilaterally amend 
the medical staff bylaws.”). 
 125.  Id. (“Any powers supposedly granted to the medical staff under the 
medical staff bylaws ‘must originate from, and be authorized by, the Board 
pursuant to the Corporate Bylaws.’” (quoting Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 
N.W.2d 150, 155 (S.D. 2001))). 
 126.  Id. at 711 (“[T]he authority to unilaterally amend the medical staff 
bylaws, as stated in the corporate bylaws, was also expressly retained by Avera 
Marshall in the medical staff bylaws.”). 
 127.  Id. at 713. 
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authority over the medical staff and determines that doing so is in 
the best interest of the hospital and patient care.”128 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Lack of Consideration 
Generally, consideration requires one party to voluntarily 
assume an obligation in return for an act or forbearance by the 
other party.129 It is well settled that a promise to do something that 
one is already legally obligated to do does not constitute 
consideration.130 Accordingly, the majority erred when it 
determined that there was sufficient consideration to create an 
enforceable contract between Avera Marshall and its medical 
staff.131 
Under Minnesota law, a hospital is obligated to appoint a 
medical staff.132 Furthermore, the medical staff is required by state 
law to, “with the approval of the governing body, adopt bylaws, rules, 
regulations, and policies for the proper conduct of its work.”133 
Justice Anderson, dissenting in Avera Marshall, correctly stated that 
the rules impose an obligation on a hospital’s governing body to 
not only appoint a medical staff but also adopt bylaws regulating 
the conduct of that staff.134 Additionally, state law requires that “all 
persons admitted to the hospital shall be under the professional 
care of a member of the medical staff.”135 Hence, physicians 
administering care to patients at Avera Marshall are required by law 
to be members of the medical staff and thereby subject to the 
legally required medical staff bylaws. 
The majority erroneously contended that the bylaws exceed 
the minimum standards required by state law and therefore satisfy 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See, e.g., U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 578 N.W.2d 
752, 754 (Minn. 1998). 
 130.  See, e.g., Tonka Tours, Inc. v. Chadima, 372 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 
1985) (“[I]f a party did or promised to do what he was already legally obligated to 
do, there existed no sufficient consideration to support this new promise.”). 
 131.  See Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 703 (majority opinion). 
 132.  MINN. R. 4640.0700, subpart 2 (2013). 
 133.  Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2 (emphasis added). 
 134.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 706 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
 135.  MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 3. 
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the consideration requirement.136 However, the broad discretion 
granted to the medical staff in adopting appropriate bylaws 
obscures how exactly the bylaws could exceed the minimum 
requirements. Likewise, the inability of the majority to indicate any 
specific means of exceeding the minimum requirements supports 
the conclusion that its holding was erroneous.137 
Another argument is that consideration arises from the 
hospital’s granting of clinical privileges in return for a physician’s 
promise to be bound by the medical staff bylaws.138 However, this 
argument overlooks the fact that Avera Marshall is obligated to 
appoint a medical staff139 and legally required to place all admitted 
patients “under the professional care of . . . the medical staff.”140 
These requirements, paired with the legal obligation to adopt 
bylaws governing the designated medical staff,141 demonstrate a 
plain preexisting duty negating any claim of consideration.142 State 
law already requires physicians to abide by the medical staff 
bylaws.143 Furthermore, despite its discretion in granting privileges, 
Avera Marshall has no discretion in applying the medical staff 
bylaws to individual physicians.144 All physicians treating patients in 
the hospital must be members of the medical staff, and all 
 
 136.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 702 (majority opinion) (“[B]ylaws which 
exceed the minimum standards required under state law satisfy the consideration 
requirement.” (alteration in original) (quoting Dallon, supra note 13, at 647)). 
 137.  Cf. O’Byrne v. Santa Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 584 
(Ct. App. 2001) (“Plaintiff does not explain precisely how the Bylaws are more 
expansive and comprehensive than those provided for by law, in light of the broad 
discretion given the medical staff to adopt appropriate bylaws.”). 
 138.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 703 (“[F]ocusing solely on Avera 
Marshall’s preexisting duty to adopt medical staff bylaws completely ignores the 
fact that, before a doctor can be granted privileges at the hospital, the doctor must 
agree to abide by the medical staff bylaws.”). 
 139.  See MINN. R. 4640.0700, subpart 2. 
 140.  Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 3. 
 141.  Id. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2. 
 142.  O’Byrne, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 583 (finding no consideration where state 
law required a medical center to appoint medical staff, required medical staff to 
adopt bylaws, and required medical staff to abide by those bylaws). 
 143.  See MINN. R. 4640.0800, subparts 1–2. By requiring medical staff to adopt 
bylaws governing the “proper conduct of its work,” the statute implicitly requires 
them to abide by said bylaws. Id. 
 144.  See id.; see also Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. 2014) 
(“Avera Marshall maintains that it adopted the medical staff bylaws because it had 
a preexisting legal duty to do so under Minnesota administrative rules and Avera 
Marshall’s own bylaws.”). 
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members of the medical staff must abide by the medical staff 
bylaws.145 Thus, physicians joining the medical staff have a 
preexisting legal duty to abide by medical staff bylaws, regardless of 
any specific request by Avera Marshall. In the face of a clear 
preexisting legal duty, it is evident that the medical staff bylaws lack 
the requisite consideration necessary to forge an enforceable 
contract. 
B. Lack of Mutual Assent 
Contract formation requires mutual assent among the parties 
to the contract’s essential terms.146 Thus, where a party expresses 
clear intent not to be bound by the terms of a contract, there is no 
mutual assent.147 Specifically, where an element of mutual assent, 
such as an offer, provides express language reserving an 
unrestrained discretion to one party, a binding contract cannot 
arise from it.148 Mutual assent and a party’s intent are assessed 
under an objective standard.149 
One of the express purposes of Avera Marshall’s medical staff 
bylaws is “[t]o provide a means whereby issues concerning the 
Medical Staff and Medical Center [could] be directly discussed . . . 
with the understanding that the Medical Staff [was] subject to the 
ultimate authority of the Board of Directors.”150 Indeed, the explicit 
language of the medical staff bylaws as they apply to the disputed 
amendment and repeal process states that the entire process is 
“‘subject to approval by a majority vote of [the board]’ and could 
not ‘supersede the general authority of [the board] as set forth in 
 
 145.  See MINN. R. 4640.0800, subpart 2. 
 146.  SCI Minn. Funeral Servs., Inc. v. Washburn-McReavy Funeral Corp., 795 
N.W.2d 855, 864 (Minn. 2011) (citing Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of 
Health, 705 N.W.2d 181, 185 (Minn. 2005)). 
 147.  See Hamilton v. Boyce, 234 Minn. 290, 292, 48 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1951) 
(citing Tyra v. Cheney, 129 Minn. 428, 152 N.W. 835 (1915)) (holding that no 
contract is formed where one party is aware that the other party does not intend to 
be bound by the written instrument). 
 148.  Grenier v. Air Express Int’l Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1201 (D. Minn. 
2001) (finding no contract where an offer contained an express reservation of 
discretion regarding the definition of a contractual term). 
 149.  Anderson Mktg., Inc. v. Maple Chase Co., 241 F.3d 1063, 1063 (8th Cir. 
2001) (applying Minnesota law); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 
532, 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (1962). 
 150.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added). 
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its corporate bylaws or applicable common law or statutes.’”151 This 
plain language indicates an objective intent that Avera Marshall did 
not intend to be bound by the bylaws.152 Furthermore, where the 
medical staff bylaws, an alleged contract, unambiguously reserve 
final authority in one party, it stretches the bounds of logic to claim 
that such a party intended to be contractually bound by those 
bylaws.153 
Considered in tandem with the general public policy 
considerations present in this case,154 the express reservation of 
discretionary authority by the hospital’s governing board supports 
an unambiguous interpretation that no contract arises from the 
medical staff bylaws. In fact, the governing board’s legal and ethical 
responsibility to ensure high standards of patient care establishes a 
clear contextual backdrop from which one may objectively 
ascertain intent to retain discretionary control over the 
administrative procedures of its medical staff.155 Sound case law, 
express language, and contextual background all support the 
conclusion that Avera Marshall manifested an objective intent not 
to be bound by the medical staff bylaws. 
Furthering such an interpretation is the fact that some courts 
have distinguished between medical staff bylaws and hospital bylaws 
created by the hospital’s governing board, noting that staff bylaws 
may be less likely to create contractual rights.156 In this case, a level 
of bifurcated authority is evident in the specific language of the 
 
 151.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 152.  Cf. Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) 
(concluding that a hospital did not intend to be bound by staff bylaws where the 
preamble of staff bylaws stated that the bylaws were “subject to the ultimate 
authority of the applicable governing bodies”). 
 153.  See id.; see also Talwar v. Catholic Healthcare Partners, 258 F. App’x 800, 
805 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The self-declared purpose of the Bylaws and Credentials 
Manual is to protect the best interests of patients, regulate activities of the medical 
staff, and insure the provision of quality medical care for the hospital’s patients, 
not to declare or create contractual rights of individual members of the medical 
staff.”). 
 154.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 155.  See infra Part IV.C (exploring the law governing the liability of hospitals 
for substandard patient care). 
 156.  See Gonzalez v. San Jacinto Methodist Hosp., 880 S.W.2d 436, 438–40 
(Tex. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff-physician could not have vested rights 
arising from medical staff bylaws); see also Tredrea v. Anesthesia & Analgesia, P.C., 
584 N.W.2d 276, 284–87 (Iowa 1998) (distinguishing hospital bylaws from medical 
staff bylaws). 
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bylaws, stating that the amendment and repeal process laid out in 
the medical staff bylaws cannot “‘supersede the general authority of 
[the board]’ . . . .”157 The language of the bylaws themselves directly 
implies a two-tiered structure wherein the governing board 
maintains control over and above the bylaws. Therefore, given the 
express language of Avera Marshall’s medical staff bylaws and the 
apparent intent not to be bound to the bylaws, the better holding 
appears to be that there can be no mutual assent and thus no 
contractual rights arising from the bylaws.158 
While the dissent did present a secondary argument contesting 
the element of mutual assent based on the difficulty of identifying 
the parties in the contract,159 that argument ultimately fell flat. The 
dissent’s position hinged on the question of whether Avera 
Marshall’s opposite party in the purported contract is the medical 
staff as a whole or each individual medical staff member.160 Setting 
aside the issue of whether the medical staff as a body has standing 
to sue,161 the facts of the present case do not support the dissent’s 
claim of party ambiguity. The facts evidence that, regardless of the 
capacity or status of the medical staff as a whole, the purported 
contract under dispute arose between Avera Marshall and each 
individual member of the medical staff with privileges at the 
hospital.162 Avera Marshall offered the individual members 
privileges as part of their agreement to be bound by the medical 
staff bylaws.163 In general, most jurisdictions acknowledge the 
individual physician as an identifiable party when considering 
 
 157.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 697 (Minn. 2014) (alteration in 
original). 
 158.  See Munoz v. Flower Hosp., 507 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) 
(asserting that a trial court could reasonably conclude that staff bylaws did not 
constitute a contract where the hospital expressed clear intent not to be bound by 
the bylaws). 
 159.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 708 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“There is 
another problem with the appellants’ argument that the medical staff bylaws 
constitute a contract—namely, who are the parties to the contract?”). 
 160.  See id. 
 161.  See id. at 700 (majority opinion) (recognizing the medical staff’s “capacity 
to sue and be sued under Minnesota law”). 
 162.  See id. at 702–03 (“The record in this case indicates that Avera Marshall 
formed a contractual relationship with each member of the Medical Staff upon 
appointment. Avera Marshall offered privileges to each member of the Medical 
Staff, so long as the Medical Staff member agreed to be bound by the medical staff 
bylaws . . . .”). 
 163.  See id. 
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medical staff bylaws as an enforceable contract.164 However, this 
plain recognition of the individual physicians as parties to the 
alleged contract does not preclude the ultimate conclusion that 
consideration is lacking.165 As previously stated, the formation of a 
contract requires both mutual assent and consideration.166 Thus, 
although the parties may be readily identifiable, and assuming 
arguendo the bylaws satisfy the element of mutual assent,167 a clear 
lack of consideration may still preclude contract formation.168 
C. Public Policy Considerations 
Another pressing concern overlooked by the majority is the 
potentially chilling effect that this ruling may have on the ability of 
a hospital’s governing body to effectively manage its medical staff 
and ensure optimal patient care.169 Bearing the ultimate 
 
 164.  See, e.g., Janda v. Madera Cmty. Hosp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1184 (E.D. 
Cal. 1998) (compiling cases from across the nation and concluding that “the 
majority of jurisdictions have held that hospital bylaws, when approved and 
adopted by the governing board, are a binding and enforceable contract between 
the hospital and physicians”); see also Williams v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 688 F. 
Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (D. Nev. 2010) (“The physician makes an offer to become a 
member of the hospital staff by applying for privileges at the hospital. The hospital 
and staff accept that offer by granting the physician privileges.”). 
 165.  See O’Byrne v. Santa Monica-UCLA Med. Ctr., 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 584 
(Ct. App. 2001) (acknowledging implicitly the status of an individual physician as a 
party in an alleged contract formed by medical staff bylaws but finding no 
enforceable contract for want of consideration); Egan v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 
244 S.W.3d 169, 174 (Mo. 2008) (finding no contract between individual physician 
and hospital under medical staff bylaws due to lack of consideration from the 
hospital, which had a preexisting duty under state regulation to conform to the 
bylaws). 
 166.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 167.  However, as addressed earlier, mutual assent is absent in this case due to 
the express intent of Avera Marshall not to be bound by the medical staff bylaws. 
See supra Part IV.B. 
 168.  See supra Part IV.A; see also Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 701 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)) (“A contract is 
formed when two or more parties exchange bargained-for promises, manifest 
mutual assent to the exchange, and support their promises with consideration.”). 
 169.  See Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 712–13 (Anderson, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] hospital’s board of directors must be allowed to amend medical staff bylaws 
when it has expressly reserved ultimate authority over the medical staff and 
determines that doing so is in the best interest of the hospital and patient care.”); 
see also Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Hospital Ass’n & American Hospital Ass’n 
at 5, Avera Marshall III, 836 N.W.2d 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (No. A12-2117), 
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responsibility for the quality of patient care,170 the governing 
authority of a hospital must be able to aggressively respond to 
potential lapses in the quality of care provided by its medical 
staff.171 Contrary to this necessity, the majority opinion generated a 
potentially harmful expansion of a medical staff’s autonomy from a 
hospital’s governing body.172 
Under Minnesota law, the hospital bears significant 
responsibility for the safety and well-being of its patients.173 
Although individual physicians are certainly held liable for their 
own negligent actions, hospitals may also carry independent 
liability for their part in granting privileges to an allegedly 
incompetent physician.174 In light of the hospital’s substantial 
liability in the event of substandard patient care, a reasonable 
interpretation of the law concerning hospital administration and 
accountability as applied in recent decades manifests public policy 
 
2013 WL 10123966, at *5 (“Because hospital boards—not medical staffs—bear 
ultimate responsibility for the hospital’s accomplishment of its mission, hospital 
boards must be able to exercise their authority to meet that responsibility.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 170.  See Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 313 (Minn. 2007) (recognizing 
the tort of negligent credentialing and thereby holding that a hospital can be held 
liable for substandard care arising from negligent monitoring of the competence 
and conduct of physicians granted privileges by the hospital). 
 171.  See DEAN M. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE AND ETHICS 
133–34 (2d ed. 2003) (“Human lives are at stake, and the governing board must 
be given discretion in its selection so it can be confident in the competence and 
moral commitment of its staff.” (quoting Sosa v. Val Verde Mem’l Hosp., 437 F.2d 
173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971))). 
 172.  See Brian M. Peters & Robin Locke Nagele, Promoting Quality Care & 
Patient Safety: The Case for Abandoning the Joint Commission’s “Self-Governing” Medical 
Staff Paradigm, 14 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 313, 317–18 (2010) (“[T]he notional 
concept of medical staff ‘self-governance,’ or autonomy from the governing body, 
too often results in a paralytic environment characterized by the governing body 
either avoiding or inadequately pursuing aggressive compliance with 
Quality/Safety standards.”). 
 173.  See Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 313 (adopting common law claim of negligent 
credentialing); see also Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 387–
90, 53 N.W.2d 17, 19–21 (1952) (holding that a hospital owes a direct duty of care 
to patients to protect them from harm by third persons); Mulliner v. Evangelischer 
Diakonniessenverein of Minn. Dist. of German Evangelical Synod of N. Am., 144 
Minn. 392, 394, 175 N.W. 699, 699–700 (1920) (recognizing the duty of a hospital 
to provide its patients with as sufficient a number of attendants as the safety of the 
patients may require). 
 174.  See Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 313. 
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considerations that strongly counter the conclusions of the majority 
opinion.175 In so many words, the prevailing trend of hospital 
liability demonstrates a purpose and intent to identify hospitals and 
their administrative bodies as primary actors in credentialing 
physicians and ensuring safe, quality patient care.176 Yet, the 
majority’s decision in the present case undermines this purpose by 
potentially exposing hospitals to costly and disruptive litigation, 
placing governing boards in a catch-22: either aggressively respond 
to a physician’s ineffective care and face litigation from medical 
staff members or handle ineffective physicians cautiously and risk 
patients suing for negligent credentialing.177 By ruling as it did, the 
majority put forth a body of law that, when viewed in its broader 
context, simultaneously reproaches hospitals for failing to act 
against incompetent physicians while restricting the means by 
which hospitals may uphold their legal duty to act. 
In ruling that the medical staff bylaws were an enforceable 
contract,178 the majority decision effectively quashed the hospital 
governing board’s ability to unilaterally amend the medical staff 
bylaws and thereby reinforced an outdated model of medical staff 
 
 175.  Brief of Amici Curiae Minnesota Hospital Ass’n & American Hospital 
Ass’n, supra note 169, at 6 (“A decision in this case that diminished the authority 
of a hospital board to manage the affairs of the hospital . . . would run contrary to 
public policy regarding hospital administration and accountability as it has 
developed over the last forty years.”). 
 176.  The trend pervades not only Minnesota, but also the nation as a whole. 
See, e.g., Fridena v. Evans, 622 P.2d 463, 466–67 (Ariz. 1980) (upholding the 
liability of a hospital for negligent supervision of the competence of its medical 
staff); Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 313; Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 395–96 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1980) (recognizing the duty of a hospital to “make a reasonable effort to 
monitor and oversee the treatment which is prescribed and administered by 
physicians practicing at the facility”); Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 
708 (Pa. 1991) (adopting a doctrine of corporate negligence under which “the 
hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient, 
which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-being while at the hospital”); 
Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168–70 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a hospital 
owes an independent duty to patients to supervise the medical treatment provided 
by members of its medical staff). 
 177.  See Elisabeth Belmont et al., Quality in Action: Paradigm for a Hospital 
Board-Driven Quality Program, 4 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 95, 128–29 (2011) 
(“Concern over the cost and disruption of such [physician] litigation can deter 
hospitals that otherwise would be more proactive in taking action against 
individual physicians based on quality concerns.”). 
 178.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 704 (Minn. 2014). 
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autonomy,179 a model which has been described as “a prohibitive 
barrier to real progress in achieving a ‘zero-defect’ ‘safety 
culture.’”180 Recognizing that one of the predominant goals of 
hospitals is safeguarding a high standard of medical care within 
their walls, multiple reformers have criticized the persistent model 
of bifurcated hospital leadership for diminishing the capacity of 
hospitals to effectively meet one of their driving objectives.181 In its 
reasoning in the present case, the court revealed a distressing blind 
spot to the broader implications of its ruling,182 particularly its 
effect of stifling systemic innovations that could markedly improve 
patient safety and quality of care.183 
Enforcing medical staff bylaws as a legal contract creates 
another obstacle on the path towards an administrative model of 
integrated executive authority that better ensures a high quality of 
care.184 Threatened by possible litigation, hospitals may be hard-
pressed to take the necessary steps towards substantive change in 
executive structures.185 The unfortunate byproduct of such 
hesitancy is that it may hinder hospitals’ adoption of integrated 
governance models that can provide both higher quality and 
higher efficiency in health care delivery.186 
 
 179.  Where the medical staff bylaws constitute an enforceable contract, the 
hospital governing board is obligated to comply with the terms of the bylaws and 
therefore cannot unilaterally amend the bylaws without breaching the contract. 
 180.  Peters & Nagele, supra note 172, at 371. 
 181.  See generally Belmont et al., supra note 177, at 108 (explaining that “[the 
bifurcated] model can foster a diffusion of responsibility and accountability for 
the quality of professional services”); Peters & Nagele, supra note 172, at 371–72 
(outlining “viable alternatives” that are “free from the deep-seated conflicts and 
performance barriers inherent in [the] bifurcated governance structure”). 
 182.  See supra Part III.B (discussing the majority’s reasoning). 
 183.  See Peters & Nagele, supra note 172, at 371 (“[E]mphasis on physician 
autonomy and ‘self-governance’ seriously detracts from, and operates as a barrier 
to, the industry’s overall move towards coordination and integration of care as a 
way of producing both higher quality and greater efficiency in the health care 
delivery system.”). 
 184.  See id. 
 185.  Id. at 367 (“[T]he threat of costly and contentious medical staff litigation 
. . . frequently deters a fragmented hospital leadership from taking needed 
disciplinary or corrective action.”). 
 186.  See id. at 371 (crediting the international acclaim of high-achieving 
healthcare systems to their successful integration of the physician, governing body, 
and executive leadership into a unified, system-wide approach to quality and 
safety). 
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Thus, in addition to the issues of consideration and mutual 
assent that already plague the majority opinion,187 the public policy 
considerations underlying the case reveal a backdrop of law and 
policy concerns directly countering the court’s decision. Bearing 
such considerations in mind, the court’s ruling and the resulting 
effect on the stated policy concerns are plainly erroneous and 
contrary to sound judicial policy. 
D. Noncontractual Judicial Enforceability 
Finally, although the medical staff bylaws may not be an 
enforceable contract, whether the court may still have a limited 
scope of judicial review independent of any contractual obligation 
merits consideration. Some jurisdictions have determined that 
medical staff bylaws, though not contractual, may still be subject to 
judicial review.188 Such review is generally predicated on two public 
policy arguments: (1) the legislature would not mandate that 
hospitals create medical staff bylaws unless it intended for hospitals 
to be bound by them; and (2) there is an implicit statutory purpose 
not only to protect the well-being of patients, but also to protect 
doctors from arbitrary disciplinary processes.189 In those cases 
where courts have granted judicial oversight, such review has been 
notably limited, providing only sufficient injunctive relief to 
compel hospitals to adhere to the procedures detailed in their 
medical staff bylaws.190 The courts still recognize that the hospital’s 
governing board, rather than the courts, retains ultimate authority 
over medical staffing decisions.191 Thus, even those jurisdictions 
that call for judicial review of medical staff bylaws explicitly 
 
 187.  See supra Part IV.A–.B. 
 188.  See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D. 
Ga. 1992) (ruling that medical staff bylaws do not constitute a contract per se, but 
hospitals may nonetheless be enjoined to adhere to their own procedures as 
established in the bylaws); Egan v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 244 S.W.3d 169, 174 
(Mo. 2008) (“A hospital’s obligation to act in accordance with its bylaws . . . is 
independent of any contractual obligation the hospital may have to the doctor.”); 
see supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 189.  See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
 190.  See Egan, 244 S.W.3d at 174 (“This Court, then, will not impose judicial 
review on the merits of a hospital’s staffing decisions, but will act only to ensure 
substantial compliance with the hospital’s bylaws.”). 
 191.  See id. (“[I]t is clear that final authority to make staffing decisions is 
securely vested in the hospital’s governing body with advice from the medical 
staff.”). 
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recognize the hospital’s authority and notably restrict the scope of 
the court’s decision.192 
In the present case, Minnesota law appears to strongly support 
the position that the legislature would not mandate bylaws unless it 
intended for the hospital to adhere to those bylaws.193 To rule that 
statutorily mandated medical staff bylaws do not bind a hospital to 
some degree would render the governing statute ineffective.194 
Thus, one may reasonably conclude that medical staff bylaws, by 
virtue of their statutory requirement, may be judicially enforceable 
where a hospital refuses to adhere to the procedures laid out in its 
own governing bylaws. 
Having affirmed that hospitals may be bound by the 
procedures of their bylaws, the next question to ask is whether 
Avera Marshall failed to abide by its own medical staff bylaws. 
Tracking similar points as its argument against mutual assent,195 the 
dissent correctly deduced that Avera Marshall did not breach the 
medical staff bylaws by unilaterally changing the bylaws.196 In Mahan 
v. Avera Saint Luke’s, the court emphasized that staff bylaws are 
generally derived from corporate bylaws.197 Although not binding 
in the present case, Mahan effectively illustrates the particular legal 
relationship between corporate bylaws and staff bylaws: 
Their legal relationship is similar to that between statutes 
and a constitution. They are not separate and equal 
sovereigns. The former derives its power and authority 
from the latter. Hence, to determine whether the staff was 
granted the power that it now claims to possess, any 
 
 192.  See id. 
 193.  See MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2014) (“[T]he legislature intends the entire 
statute to be effective and certain.”); see also Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 548 
N.W.2d 281, 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (“We must also assume that the legislature 
intended statutes to be effective and certain.” (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) 
(1994))), aff’d, 560 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1997). 
 194.  See Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 1002 (N.D. 
Ga. 1992) (“The Georgia legislature would not have mandated that the hospital 
create these procedures, if the legislature had not intended that the hospital 
follow the procedures once they were implemented.”). 
 195.  Specifically, the express reservation of ultimate authority is in the hands 
of the governing board. See supra Part IV.B. 
 196.  Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d 695, 711 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J., 
dissenting). 
 197.  621 N.W.2d 150, 155 (S.D. 2001) (“[A]ny powers supposedly granted 
under the Staff Bylaws must originate from, and be authorized by, the Board 
pursuant to the Corporate Bylaws.”). 
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judicial analysis must begin with an examination of the 
Corporate Bylaws.198 
As applied to Avera Marshall, this understanding of corporate 
bylaws as the origin of powers granted under medical staff bylaws 
supports the conclusion that the express language of the corporate 
bylaws supersedes any implied authority generated in the medical 
staff bylaws.199 
Therefore, where the corporate bylaws expressly reserve 
ultimate authority in Avera Marshall’s governing board,200 it may 
reasonably be concluded that medical staff bylaws lack the 
authority to supersede the decisions of the governing board. 
Additionally, the language of the corporate bylaws did not 
specifically require approval from the medical staff for the 
governing board to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws.201 
This limitation on the medical staff’s power to oppose the 
governing board, coupled with the broad power vested in the 
board, further supports the conclusion that the governing board 
acted within its authority under the corporate bylaws, and by 
extension under the medical staff bylaws, when it unilaterally 
changed the medical staff bylaws without a two-thirds vote from 
voting members of the medical staff.202 
In conclusion, although Minnesota courts may indeed have 
the power to enjoin hospitals to adhere to the procedures 
established in their bylaws, the specific language of the bylaws in 
the present case precludes the court’s judicial review. Avera 
Marshall’s corporate bylaws expressly reserve ultimate authority to 
the hospital’s governing board with regard to amending or 
 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  The explicit language of the medical staff bylaws themselves also supports 
this interpretation. See Avera Marshall IV, 857 N.W.2d at 697 (majority opinion) 
(noting that the amendment and repeal process “could not ‘supersede the general 
authority of [the board] as set forth in its corporate bylaws or applicable common 
law or statutes’” (alteration in original)). 
 200.  See id. at 710 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“The Board of Directors shall 
exercise oversight of the business affairs of [Avera Marshall] and shall have and 
exercise all of the powers which may be exercised or performed by [Avera 
Marshall] under the laws of the State of Minnesota, the Corporation’s Articles of 
Incorporation, and these Bylaws . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
 201.  Id. (“Proposed bylaws, rules and regulations, or amendments thereto, 
may be recommended by the medical-dental staff or the Board of Directors.” (quoting Avera 
Marshall Corporate Bylaws § 15.3)). 
 202.  Id. at 704. 
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repealing the medical staff bylaws.203 Given this clear reservation of 
authority, Avera Marshall reasonably adhered to the procedures of 
its own bylaws when it unilaterally amended the medical staff 
bylaws. Thus, where the governing board does not exceed its 
authority, the court has no grounds for granting injunctive relief. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Avera Marshall presented the Minnesota Supreme Court with 
the novel question of determining whether medical staff bylaws 
could constitute an enforceable contract between a hospital and its 
medical staff.204 The court incorrectly held that there was suitable 
consideration in the bylaws to form a contract.205 The majority 
failed to closely analyze the governing state law and accurately 
identify the preexisting legal duties that precluded consideration. 
Furthermore, the majority’s misinterpretation of the express 
language of the bylaws led it to incorrectly conclude that the 
defendant intended to be bound by the bylaws.206 This ruling may 
pose trouble in the future by limiting hospitals’ abilities to resolve 
staffing concerns by amending medical staff bylaws.207 
Minnesota contract law and sound public policy both support 
a finding contrary to the unfortunate ruling of the majority 
opinion.208 A better conclusion would be that the medical staff 
bylaws do not constitute an enforceable contract under Minnesota 
law and the hospital’s governing body is within its rightful authority 
to unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws where such authority 
has been expressly reserved. 
 
 
 203.  Id. at 697 (majority opinion) (“[T]he amendment and repeal process was 
‘subject to approval by a majority vote of [the board]’ and could not ‘supersede 
the general authority of [the board] as set forth in its corporate bylaws or 
applicable common law or statutes.’” (alteration in original)). 
 204.  Id. at 698–99. 
 205.  Id. at 703. 
 206.  See id. at 702 n.4. 
 207.  See id. at 712 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“I am concerned that today’s 
majority opinion will encourage conflict between medical staffs and a hospital’s 
board of directors.”); supra Part IV.C. 
 208.  See supra Part IV. 
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